SECRET

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #8154-80/1 17 December 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence	
VIA :	Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment National Intelligence Officer for Warning	25X1
FROM :	National Intelligence Officer for Africa	
SUBJECT :	Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa	25X1
information. 2. <u>Background</u> 16 December 1980 has not been cook	Requested: None; the attached report is for your und: Community representatives and specialists met on with the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report redinated with the other participants, but is being em. If they feel their views have been misinterpreted, significant additional concerns, I'll report further to	

L. Gray Cowan

Attachment NFAC #8154-80

This memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED when separated from Attachment.

25 X 1

SECRET

Approved For Release 2007/05/17 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000300070004-7

SECRET

NFAC #8154-80 17 December 1980

WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA* No. 26

UGANDA

It is premature to suggest any specific developments resulting from the election in which Obote was returned to the presidency. Calm appears to have prevailed since the election despite earlier threats of violent retaliation from minority parties in the wake of charges of election fraud. Analysts felt that, so long as Tanzanian troops remained in the country, it was unlikely that there would be more than sporadic violence. While the Soviets are pleased with the results, they will probably remain aloof for the next few months until they see whether stability will prevail. It is possible that the new government will be prepared to accept more Cuban aid.

HORN OF AFRICA

It was generally agreed that the situation for Siad is becoming worse internally. We do not yet have sufficient information to come to any real conclusion as to Mengistu's ultimate intentions. While he probably would not object to seeing the departure of Siad, we have no substantial evidence that his objective is the overthrow of the Siad regime. The Ethiopians intend to retain pressure along the Ogaden border. Too much should not, however, be read into the recent joint communique by Mengistu and Moi attacking Siad.

CHAD

The situation in Chad in the view of the analysts is becoming both more serious and more complex. There are at least 6,000 Libyan troops in Chad, and Qadhafi's intentions are not yet clear. Habre has retreated into the Cameroon after being defeated at Ndjamena. This will increase the danger of a spillover of fighting into Cameroon, Niger and Sudan. The Egyptian and French positions are not yet clear; in part the possibility of French intervention is dependent on the attitude of the Central and West African states. If the French are invited in by them, they may take military action to protect French interests in the surrounding countries. They may, however, be reluctant to commit troops for fear of public reaction prior to the French national elections in April. If

SECRET

^{*} This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/AF. Its purpose is to review <u>possible</u> developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously, many of these developments will not occur in the time frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.

SECRET

-2-

Qadhafi is frustrated in his efforts in Chad by Western intervention, analysts felt that it may mean that he would take more vigorous anti-Western action by occupying Western embassies or engaging in terrorist acts outside Libya.

ZAIRE

Analysts continue to be worried about increased reporting of dissension in the Zairian military. Deteriorating civilian military relationships will ultimately have an effect on Mobutu's efforts to bolster up the internal economic situation.

BOTSWANA

The recent move of the Botswana government to purchase Soviet arms is a matter of substantial concern to the community. There was general agreement that this move was more a function of internal Botswana politics than a swing to the left on the part of the Botswana government. Ian Khama, the son of the late head of government and deputy commander of the military, is strongly influenced by the Soviets. He is also the traditional chief of the Tswana people and likely to be the next president. The major question is not necessarily the presence of Soviet advisors in Botswana (although in view of the Namibian situation, this is in itself disturbing), but rather the extent of the South African reaction. It is not yet clear how far the South Africans will permit the Botswana government to go without retaliating. The situation will require close watching over the next three months.

MOZAMBIQUE

Analysts were concerned about the increased operations, supported by the South Africans, of the insurgent National Resistance Movement (NRM). NRM troops under arms have increased markedly in the past few months. There appears to be a void in Machel's efforts to combat this insurgency. In its strong support for the NRM, the South Africans may have miscalculated and weakened the Machel government (which they probably do not seek to overturn) more than they expected.

SECRET

-3-

NFAC #8154-80

	NI AC # 0134-00
ran Africa	·
	25X1
	25X1
	25 <u>X</u> 1 25 <u>X</u> 1
	25X1
NIO/PE CTS/NCPO NPOC/IEG OCO/FLS	
DDCI DD/NFA DD/NFAC NIO/W SA/CI ER NFAC/AS NFAC/REG	v/att NFAC #8154-80/1)
NIO/AF	25X1
	25X1 25X1
	NIO/PE CTS/NCPO NPOC/IEG OCO/FLS DCI DD/NFA DD/NFAC NIO/W SA/CI ER NFAC/AS

SECRET